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SOCIAL NETWORKING WEB SITES: WHO SURVIVES? 
 
ABSTRACT. This paper studies the relationship between the characteristics of social network sites 
(SNSs) and their probability of survival. The data sample includes 224 SNSs launched throughout 
the world from 1995 to 2015 and that can be described by focus strategy, business financing 
methods and interactions with external companies, such as partnerships, mergers and acquisitions. 
Three factors are systematically associated with closure hazard rates. First, compared with SNSs 
that address a specialized audience, generalist SNSs have a three times higher probability of 
closing. Second, being the target of a merger or acquisition more than doubles the probability of 
closure. Third, new entrants have a higher probability to survive if compared with SNSs with 
experience in the industry.  
 
JEL: D22, L82. 
KEYWORDS: social networking websites, mass media, media management, firm survival, duration 
analysis. 
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SOCIAL NETWORKING WEB SITES: WHO SURVIVES? 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Network effects usually raise antitrust issues, because the “winners take it all” rule can lead to 
highly concentrated markets. In reality, network effects have negative consequences even on 
market definition and on the feasibility of empirical analyses. In fact, few subjects achieve a mass 
of users large enough to trigger an automatic network expansion. Thus, researchers can only 
observe the characteristics and behavior of the winners. The losers leave evanescent traces, which 
are often inadequate for an empirical analysis. 
This situation is typical of social networking sites (SNSs). Given the absence of strong barriers to 
entry and the apparent ease of implementing an online virtual community (Albarran, 2013), since 
the mid-1990s many entrepreneurs have attempted to achieve economic success by launching 
general or specialized SNSs. Today, we know a great deal about those who succeeded and little 
about those who failed: the digital traces of the losers rapidly disappear. This biased information 
complicates the empirical study of the industry and has scarce relevance for managerial and policy 
purposes.  
To fill this gap, this paper builds a database of SNSs appearing from January 1995 to March 2015. 
The sample includes 224 SNSs, of which 181 are active and 43 are defunct. The empirical analysis 
focuses on the technological and structural antecedents that can affect the survival of an SNS.  
The economic studies on SNSs are mainly theoretical, although an increasing number of empirical 
applications are coming to light. For example, some scholars explored the behavior of SNS users 
(Kossinets and Watts, 2006; Lin, 2008; Shriver et al., 2013; Wilcox and Stephen, 2013; Tucker, 
2014), while others focused on the strength of network effects (Henkel and Block, 2013), on firms’ 
strategies (Miller et al., 2009) and on cross-border connectivity (Rohn, 2014). However, the bulk of 
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empirical work consisted of experiments on single networks or on the data analysis of major 
examples, such as Facebook or Twitter. No study has explored the issue of SNS success/failure in 
the aggregate. Hence, the next section reviews the “established” literature on firm survival and 
discusses the application of its major findings to the SNS industry. Section 3 describes the data, 
while Section 4 shows the results of the empirical analysis, which can be summarized as follows. 
From a static and dynamic perspective, only three circumstances are significantly correlated with 
survival: if an SNS addresses a specialized audience, the probability of survival is considerably 
higher. Secondly, when an external company purchases an SNS, the probability of the latter 
shutting down increases significantly. Finally, the age of SNSs is negatively correlated with the 
probability of survival. Section 5 concludes the paper, describes its limitations and suggests the 
policy implications of the empirical results.  
 
2. FIRM SURVIVAL: THEORY, PREVIOUS EMPIRICAL WORK AND APPLICATION TO SNSs 
 
The literature on firm survival is a recognized field of research that assesses the impact of firm and 
industry characteristics on the probability of failing or exiting the market. The most discussed 
“internal” factor related to entry, survival and exit is firm size. The empirical studies have generally 
found that larger firms that enter a market have a higher probability of survival (Aldrich and 
Auster, 1986; Mata and Portugal, 1994; Wagner, 1994; Geroski et al., 2002; Esteve-Perez and 
Mañez-Castillejo, 2008; Strotmann, 2007; Varum and Rocha, 2012). In the SNS industry, firm size is 
not easy to assess. In terms of revenues, market share or users, every SNS enters the market with 
a size equal to zero. In addition, the data regarding the number of SNSs employees are usually not 
available. Hence, Section 3 will explore how the following factors affect the probability of survival 
of SNSs: focus of the SNSs (generalist against specialized SNSs), restriction policies, methods of 
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financing the SNS, intensity of competition, special transactions (mergers and acquisitions) and 
firm experience. 
Previous empirical studies have considered specific firm strategies and their impact on firm 
survival. For example, Audretsch (1995), Esteve-Perez and Mañez-Castillejo (2008) and Cefis and 
Marsili (2005) suggested that firms investing in R&D activities have a higher chance of survival. 
Similarly, differentiation strategies, for example the occupation of a narrow niche in the market, 
may affect the probability of survival. In their seminal contribution, Hannan and Freeman (1977) 
argued that a “generalist” company has the ability to tackle unexpected occurrences, while a 
specialized and niche oriented company faces a higher risk of failure. However, more recent 
investigations found that differentiation within-industries can increase the probability of staying in 
the market (Stern and Henderson, 2005; Zahavi and Lavie, 2013). In addition, although the 
demand of a specialist product is highly variable, a niche marketing strategy enables a faster 
growth of the firm (Cressy, 2006). Management studies also emphasize the tension between 
generalist and specialized (niche) services (see for example Deephouse, 1999). Regarding SNSs, 
targeting a general audience facilitates the achievement of a critical mass of users, which ensures 
direct monetization or advertising revenues (Canzer, 2006). “Big numbers” are important for SNSs 
in two ways. First, direct network externalities mean that the value of participating in the network 
is increasing in network size. Second, a large audience increases the willingness to pay of many 
advertisers. However, a generalist SNS must compete with many other platforms and continuously 
adjust its features to satisfy the preferences of heterogeneous users. Instead, a specialized SNS 
can focus on a more homogeneous target and occupy a niche in the industry with a low intensity 
of competition (Laudon and Traver, 2007).  
Some sector-specific factors might affect the probability of staying on the market. First, an SNS can 
exclude some categories of users from registration. For example, users under thirteen years old 
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cannot access Facebook. The effect of this policy is not obvious. On the one hand, the potential 
number of users is artificially reduced, as well as the potential advertising revenues. On the other, 
restrictions can guarantee users a minimum intimacy and homogeneity, thus increasing the utility 
of joining the network (Subrahmanyam et al., 2008). 
Regarding the source of revenues, some SNSs offer additional services upon the payment of a fee. 
As with restrictions, this practice can have contrasting effects. Premium services broaden the 
variety of content and the SNS can offer multiple packages using different pricing schemes. With 
market power, SNSs can price discriminate between users and boost profits (Wang et al., 2005; 
Enders et al., 2008). On the other hand, some users may regard the premium fee as an attempt to 
exploit their willingness to pay for additional services. SNSs might thus lose those users with a 
“free mentality” about the provision of Internet contents (Dou, 2004). 
Similar considerations apply to the selling of space and private information to advertisers. 
Traditional advertising (e.g., banners) grant resources to improve the functionality of the SNS and 
increase the probability of survival, but many users find display ads particularly annoying (Kelly et 
al., 2010). On the other hand, the observation of users’ behaviour in online communities allows 
media and advertisers to personalize the ads. Consumers can perceive the ads aligned with their 
personal interests and this can ultimately improve the advertising effectiveness (Anand and 
Shachar, 2009; Lambrecht and Tucker, 2013). However, a prerequisite for matching users’ 
preferences and advertising content is to open personal information to advertisers’ analyses and 
many users are seriously concerned about privacy issues (Taylor et al., 2011; Lee, 2013).  
Some SNSs act as an online vendor and sell goods and services directly to registered users. If the e-
commerce operations succeed, the SNS has an additional income to enhance the site and continue 
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its operations (Buhler et al., 2015) 1. Furthermore, e-commerce increases the social interactions 
among SNS users, their trust in the SNS and the probability of future transactions (Hajli, 2014). 
However, the number of transactions has to be high in order to be profitable (Armstrong and 
Hagel, 2000; Zeng and Reinartz, 2003). In addition, some users might see e-commerce as a 
debasement of the main mission of the SNS, that is, the creation of a virtual community based on 
personal linkages without commercial involvement (Huang and Benyoucef, 2013). 
Returning to the broad literature on firm survival, a recurrent result is the “liability of newness”: 
controlling for firm size, the first years of operation present a higher risk of failure/exit 
(Stinchcombe and March, 1965; Mata and Portugal, 1994), although some studies suggested a 
non-linear relationship between firm age and probability of survival (Wagner, 1994; Fackler et al., 
2013). Firm age is a proxy for firm experience, which is needed to build business relations with 
suppliers and to convince consumers to try new products (Bruderl and Schussler, 1990). These 
considerations can apply to SNSs. Although the basic idea of a virtual community is often the main 
driver of its success, experience can be crucial for strengthening the relationship with users, 
improving the service and attracting greater numbers of individuals and advertisers. In fact, the 
users’ trust in social networks is increasing in the experience of the platform (Dwyer et al., 2007; 
Fogel and Nehmad, 2009). However, some scholars suggest the possibility of liability of aging 
(Barnett, 1990; Barron et al., 1994; Ranger-Moore, 1997). In brief, firms may become progressively 
unable to generate innovations as they remain in the industry. As time goes by, older firms 
develop organizational rigidities that do not facilitate the acquisition of new knowledge and 
routines (Leonard-Barton, 1992). On the other hand, younger firms have learning advantages since 
they can explore innovative routines without the need to unlearn the old ones. The elements that 
                                                 
1 Media scholars distinguish endogenous transactions, when a platform provides physical or digital goods and services 
that users can buy, and exogenous transactions, when the SNS provider “sells third party (or user-generated) content 
to its users or enables transactions between users” (Enders et al., 2008, p. 208). 
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favor younger firms can be crucial in the SNS industry, because younger generations enter the 
social networks every year and express new preferences. 
The empirical studies on firm survival also considered “external” factors such as the intensity of 
competition. When the number of firms in an industry is high relative to market demand, the 
chance of survival is lower (Hannan and Carroll, 1992). At the same time, the regional 
agglomeration of economic activities can generate external economies of scale, which compensate 
for the higher competition of those companies with a similar location (Audretsch and Feldman, 
1996; Porter, 1998)2. Some scholars also claimed that the availability of human resources and 
qualified labor are linked to innovation and success on the market (Fritsch et al., 2006). Intensity 
of competition and regional agglomeration are not easy to assess within the SNS industry. For the 
sake of simplicity, the next section assumes the number of SNSs active in each country as a proxy 
of competition intensity. Regarding geographical issues, the development of an SNS essentially 
takes place in front of a PC, whose location is somewhat insignificant. However, more than half of 
the SNSs in the sample were launched in the U.S., where the West Coast and the Silicon Valley 
present the highest number of SNS experiments in the world, thanks to a huge concentration of 
specialized human resources (Cha, 2013). Therefore, the empirical application of the next section 
will explore whether localization in the U.S. has an impact on firm survival.  
The previous studies did not explore whether participating in a merger or acquisition has an effect 
on the probability to survive in the industry. This issue may appear unimportant from the 
perspective of a target company, which is destined to dissolve in the new legal entity. However, a 
company becomes a target if it generates revenues or profits, has an established brand or count 
on a large customer base. Once the merger is completed, closing the activities of the target or 
changing its brand can be dangerous (Basu, 2006; Clark et al., 2010), especially in the SNS industry, 
                                                 
2 Broadly speaking, knowledge spillovers associated with spatial proximity can help survival in the market (Krugman, 
1991) even with multiple and aggressive competitors. 
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where the success depends on multiple loyal users who might suspect that the SNS is changing its 
identity (Boyd and Ellison, 2007). Given the interdependence of users’ actions, an initial and slight 
drop in users can quickly develop into a rapid decline and lead to the collapse of the SNS. Of 
course, the objective of the acquisition may be the simple suppression of a dangerous competitor 
(Kwoka and Elhauge, 2012). Should this be the case, the closing of the target company would be 
the natural outcome of the predator’s strategy. On the other hand, vertical or conglomerate 
mergers do not necessarily entail the end of the target company (e.g., the acquisition of MySpace 
by News Corporation completed in 2005 – the takeover was a failure, but MySpace did not 
disappear). An SNS can also act as the buyer in an M&A process. Given the long debated 
unpredictable impact of mergers on profitability (see, for a review, Ismail et al., 2011; Das and 
Kapil, 2012), the next section will include this variable as a control. For the very same reason, the 
empirical analysis will include the partnerships with external entities among the covariates3. 
Broadly speaking, the theoretical and empirical literature on firm survival has discussed in detail 
the factors that can affect the probability of shutting down. Most of these factors are linked to 
market entry/exit conditions. However, the empirical studies did not find any structural 
antecedent that is systematically associated with firm survival.  
 
3. DATA DESCRIPTION 
 
Social network sites (SNSs) are “web-based services that allow individuals to construct a public or 
semi-public profile within a bounded system, articulate a list of other users with whom they share 
a connection, and view and traverse their list of connections and those made by others within the 
                                                 
3 There are several examples of partnership in the industry. For example, Twitter and Yandex (the largest Russian 
search engine) announced a partnership on February 21, 2012, consisting of Yandex showing new tweets in its search 
results almost immediately (Prodhan, 2012). 
 10
system” (Boyd and Ellison, 2008, p.211). Using this definition, this paper considers the SNSs 
“mentioned” in the academic literature. In particular, in March 2015 we launched the query 
“social networking websites” in EBSCOhost and collected 407 SNSs mentioned in the first 1000 
results (the list of SNSs and publications is available upon request). Then we discarded the SNSs 
without information about the characteristics needed for the empirical analysis (see below)4. We 
distributed the list of the remaining 273 SNSs to 10 paid students who were asked to confirm that 
each website was actually a SNS (students were free to verify the information provided with all the 
available channels). For each SNS, we needed at least 8 students out of 10 to accept confirmation. 
We ended with a sample of 224 SNSs. 
Each SNS of the sample is defined by the following characteristics: launch date; closure date if the 
SNS is no longer active; audience type (general against specialist5); possible restrictions (based, for 
example, on the age of users); whether or not the SNS offers premium services; whether or not 
the SNS sells advertising space; whether or not the SNS is active in e-commerce; country of origin 
(in particular, whether or not the SNS is an American company); whether or not the SNS acquired 
other companies; whether or not the SNS was the target of an acquisition6; whether or not the 
SNS became involved in a partnership.  
In order to take into partial account the “size” of SNSs, the data include the maximum number of 
accounts registered (accounts), available for only 153 SNSs. The number of users/subscribers is a 
time-variant covariate and is not available for all the years and SNSs. Here, the idea is to assess if a 
sufficient mass of users can ensure the survival and growth of an SNS. 
                                                 
4 The data on structural characteristics of the SNSs were collected within the publications retrieved in EBSCOhost. The 
data collected were integrated with other information gathered on the websites of the SNSs that were still active. 
5 We asked another ten students to establish if the SNS is generalist or specialist. The classifications of students were 
highly congruent with each other. 
6 The data regarding mergers and acquisitions were cross-checked with the Zephyr database. 
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Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of the qualitative variables. Seventy percent of SNSs use 
advertising to finance their activities, while a few act as an online vendor. Most SNSs have the 
headquarters in the U.S. (59.8%), while the sample is split evenly between specialized and general 
SNSs. The SNSs have rarely acted as a predator in mergers and acquisitions, while 61 SNSs have 
been the target of an acquisition.  
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
 active defunct total 
specialized  98 14 112 
restrictions 45 11 56 
premium 34 7 41 
advertising 120 30 150 
e-commerce 14 2 16 
us 105 29 134 
partnership 55 7 62 
M&A 19 2 21 
target 42 19 61 
Obs. 181 43 224 
 
 
4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
Before introducing the duration analysis, the data can shed some light on the static relationship 
between the explanatory variables and the probability of survival as an SNS. Table two shows the 
results of a probit analysis where the dependent variable is equal to 1 if the SNS is still active, 0 
otherwise. The explanatory variables in Table 2 are: specialized, equal to one if the SNS explicitly 
addresses a specialized audience, zero otherwise; restrictions, equal to one if the SNS imposes 
access limitations, zero otherwise; premium, equal to one if the SNS offers additional content 
upon the payment of a fee, zero otherwise; advertising, equal to one if the SNS sells advertising 
space to advertisers, zero otherwise; e-commerce, equal to one if the SNS sells goods and services 
directly to users on the website, zero otherwise; competition, the number of SNSs active in the 
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same country in each period (month); us, equal to one if the SNS has its base in the U.S., zero 
otherwise; partnership, equal to one if the SNS has been involved in a collaboration, joint venture, 
partnership, etc., zero otherwise; M&A, equal to one if the SNS has purchased external companies, 
zero otherwise; target, equal to one if the SNS has been acquired by an external company, zero 
otherwise.  
Table 2. Probit analysis: marginal effects on the probability of survival. 
 I II III IV 
specialized 0.747** 
(0.299) 
0.768** 
(0.300) 
  
restrictions 0.094 
(0.238) 
 0.080 
(0.233) 
0.074 
(0.236) 
premium 0.069 
(0.265) 
  0.044 
(0.265) 
advertising -0.086 
(0.220) 
-0.074 
(0.221) 
10.116 
(0.217) 
 
e-commerce 0.269 
(0.449) 
0.229 
(0.453) 
0.173 
(0.417) 
0.242 
(0.428) 
competition 0.019 
(0.019) 
0.019 
(0.019) 
-0.012 
(0.140) 
-0.003 
(0.210) 
us -0.310 
(0.215) 
-0.333 
(0.217) 
-0.258 
(0.209) 
-0.264 
(0.211) 
partnership 0.150 
(0.249) 
0.146 
(0.248) 
0.205 
(0.245) 
0.124 
(0.245) 
M&A 0.419 
(0.419) 
0.459 
(0.424) 
0.308 
(0.401) 
0.313 
(0.409) 
target -0.500** 
(0.214) 
-0.505** 
(0.215) 
-0.521** 
(0.212) 
-0.552*** 
(0.213) 
premium*restrictions  0.797 
(548) 
  
specialized*premium   0.213 
(0.372) 
 
specialized*advertising    0.512* 
(0.274) 
constant 0.490 
(0.496) 
0.494 
(0.498) 
1.351*** 
(0.348) 
0.980*** 
(0.358) 
LL -100.155 -98.968 -103.443 -101.827 
Pseudo R2 0.086 0.096 0.056 0.071 
Obs. 224 224 224 224 
Notes. Reported coefficients are marginal effects. Level of significance: ***0.01, **0.05, 
*0.10. Standard errors in parenthesis. 
 
Table 2 shows that only two variables are associated with the probability of survival. First, if the 
SNS is devoted to a specific audience, it has a higher chance of survival. Second, if the SNS has 
been the target of an acquisition, the probability of survival is systematically lower. The impact of 
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the other variables is not significant. Regressions II, III and IV include interaction terms, which 
however do not change the main results, although advertising seems to be more important for 
survival within SNSs devoted to a specialized audience7. 
However, these results completely ignore the fact that the duration of the SNSs is censored.  
The variable of interest in the duration analysis is the length of time that elapses from the 
beginning of an event until either its end or the end of analysis. Hence, the observation consists of 
a cross section of durations t1, t2, …, tnT, where T is a discrete or continuous random variable. 
The analysis of duration estimates the probability that the event “failure” will occur in the next 
period. In this paper, the dependent variable is the span of SNS survival, calculated as the 
difference between time t and the launch of the SNS, while the failure event coincides with the 
closure of the website. Therefore, the variable T is by necessity censored. The cumulative 
probability of the random variable T is 
 
Where f(s) is the continuous probability distribution. The probability that the period is at least of 
length t is given by the survival function 
 
and the probability that the “phenomenon” will end in the next interval of time () is 
 
                                                 
7 The following considerations suggested the interaction terms of Table 2: 1) the combination of restrictions and 
participation fees can effectively shape the audience of the SNS (premium*restrictions); 2) on the other hand, the 
payment of a participation fee can guarantee the provision of really specialized content and services 
(specialized*premium); 3) advertising can be effective and ensure relevant revenues if it targets a specific audience 
who access specialized content (specialized*advertising). The regressions in Table 2 have been replicated with further 
interaction terms and the results do not change. 
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The hazard rate is the rate at which intervals are completed after duration t (given that they last at 
least until t): 
 
 
To assess the impact of explanatory variables on the probability of survival, the Cox Proportional 
Hazard Regression estimates the parameter . In particular, the hazard function hi(t) of SNS i is 
 
where h0(t) is an arbitrary and unspecified baseline hazard function, xi is a vector of measured 
explanatory variables of the i-th SNS and  is the vector of unknown parameters to be estimated. 
A negative sign of the coefficient or a hazard ratio lower than one means that the hazard rate 
decreases, that is, the corresponding variable is associated with a higher probability of survival. 
Table 3 shows the results of a Cox regression, where the covariates are those defined for the static 
probit analysis. In addition, the variable age measures the months passed since the SNS launch, 
while gdp is the variation in domestic GDP on a monthly basis.  
 
Table 3. Cox regressions. SNSs, 1995-2015. 
 HR(1) HR(2) HR(3) HR(4) HR(5) HR(6) 
specialized 0.383** 
(0.181) 
0.361** 
(0.171) 
  0.181*** 
(0.117) 
0.158*** 
(0.108) 
restrictions 0.980 
(0.354) 
 0.933 
(0.330) 
0.966 
(0.346) 
0.739 
(0.369) 
0.714 
(0.394) 
premium 0.731 
(0.479) 
  0.703 
(0.306) 
0.893 
(0.517) 
1.603 
(0.896) 
advertising 1.245 
(0.531) 
1.199 
(0.420) 
1.273 
(0.445) 
 1.630 
(0.802) 
0.902 
(0.407) 
e-commerce 0.482 
(0.333) 
0.504 
(0.380) 
0.554 
(0.408) 
0.502 
(0.373) 
0.530 
(0.448) 
1.111 
(0.929) 
competition 0.986 
(0.031) 
0.984 
(0.030) 
1.025 
(0.223) 
1.013 
(0.024) 
0.995 
(0.043) 
0.938 
(0.043) 
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us 1.661 
(0.570) 
1.660 
(0.564) 
1.575 
(0.538) 
1.557 
(0.528) 
1.366 
(0.572) 
1.382 
(0.619) 
partnership 0.811 
(0.320) 
0.816 
(0.319) 
0.704 
(0.276) 
0.801 
(0.314) 
0.903 
(0.458) 
0.902 
(0.477) 
M&A 0.429 
(0.320) 
0.419 
(0.311) 
0.477 
(0.353) 
0.502 
(0.372) 
0.301 
(0.314) 
0.623 
(0.498) 
target 2.245** 
(0.723) 
2.216** 
(0.705) 
2.376*** 
(0.756) 
2.416*** 
(0.779) 
2.081** 
(0.854) 
 
age 1.284*** 
(0.083) 
1.279*** 
(0.083) 
1.287*** 
(0.084) 
1.268*** 
(0.083) 
1.349*** 
(0.118) 
1.329*** 
(0.120) 
gdp 0.783 
(0.527) 
0.581 
(0.271) 
0.479 
(0.385) 
0.985 
(0.783) 
0.628 
(0.611) 
0.672 
(0.601) 
accounts     0.998 
(0.006) 
 
premium*restrictions  0.240 
(0.245) 
    
specialized*premium   0.632 
(0.398) 
   
specialized*advertising    0.507 
(0.222) 
  
LL -191.915 -190.648 -194.336 -193.059 -106.200 -95.399 
Prob>chi 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 
Obs. 224 224 224 224 153 163 
Notes. HR=hazard ratio. A hazard ratio lower than one means that the corresponding variable is 
associated with a higher probability of survival, and vice versa. All variables are dummies, apart from 
competition (number of competitors in the same country), age (in months), gdp (in billion dollars) and 
accounts (in thousands).  
 
Table 3 shows that the SNSs addressing a specific public have a much higher probability of survival. 
Therefore, the advantage of tailoring an online network for a particular public more than 
compensates for the disadvantage of renouncing to a larger audience. Indeed, half of SNSs are 
devoted to a general audience, which makes competition quite intense in that segment. 
Advertisers, the main source of revenue for most SNSs, certainly look at the big numbers, but at 
the same time pay attention to the registered users’ homogeneity, which is expected to be higher 
in a specialized virtual community.  
A second result regards the age of the SNSs. “Old” SNSs have a higher probability to shut down.  
The traditional literature on firm survival explains that the age of a firm is a proxy of its 
experience, which can be crucial for maintaining a market share higher than zero. In the SNS 
industry, network effects are pervasive, and users must sustain high switching costs if they move 
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from one community to another. However, SNSs must adapt their features to waves of new users, 
whose preferences are largely unknown. Digital natives enter the “industry” and express their 
preferences simply joining one or more networks without costs. Within this turbulent 
environment, younger SNSs showed a superior ability to survive, at least in the period under 
review.  
The SNSs that are target of an acquisition have a double probability of closing the website 
compared to SNSs that remain independent. The significance of the age and target variables can 
have a “dynamic” explanation. Some companies enter the SNS industry through an acquisition and 
immediately obtain a mass of users that increases the probability of survival. In other words, a 
target SNS might continue to do social networking under a different name and thus raise the 
survival rates of “apparently new” social networks8. Casual observations within the sample show a 
mixed picture: some acquirers do not carry on doing social networking, while others incorporate 
the target companies into a proprietary website, as it is, maintaining the original brand name9. To 
control for this possible bias, column H6 of Table 3 does not consider acquisitions. The previous 
results are confirmed: specialization and age continue to affect the probability of closure.  
When the motivation of the takeover is the suppression of a dangerous competitor, the closure of 
the target company can be considered a natural outcome. However, the end of the target 
company is not the obvious consequence of vertical and conglomerate mergers.10 To control for 
the type of acquisition, the takeovers are classified as horizontal and non-horizontal. An 
acquisition is horizontal if the acquirer was already in control of another SNS at the date of the 
                                                 
8 An anonymous referee pointed out this possibility.  
9 Sometimes the acquisition process presents a different outcome: the target company is closed and the users’ 
accounts are transferred towards different services, along with some functionalities of the target SNS. For example, 
Amazon purchased PlanetAll in 1998 and shut down it after two years, announcing that PlanetAll members would be 
able to continue their social experience within the Amazon e-commerce services 
(https://www.cnet.com/news/amazon-to-shut-planetall-absorb-features/). 
10 An anonymous referee raised this issue. 
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deal (hence, the same company can conduct horizontal as well of non-horizontal acquisitions; for 
example, Yahoo took over Flickr in 2005 and Tumblr in 2013; the second acquisition is horizontal, 
the first is not). Table 4 shows that 25% of SNSs shut down after a horizontal acquisition, while 
non-horizontal takeovers lead to closure in nearly half of the cases. 
 
Table 4. Targeted firms: type of acquisition and survival 
 active defunct 
Horizontal 27 9 
Non horizontal 13 12 
 
 
However, a more rigorous analysis (probit analysis; dependent variable: closure/non-closure of the 
SNS; explanatory variables: all the variables of Table 3; n=61), shows that the probability of 
shutting down is not affected by the type of acquisition. In conclusion, horizontal acquisitions that 
suppress and then rebrand the target SNS are not a common practice. The fact remains that 
takeovers are significantly associated with a lower number of SNSs in the market. 
The different methods of financing virtual communities (advertising, e-commerce, premium 
content) do not have any effect on the probability of survival, and neither do the registration 
restrictions. Nor does the search for external contacts through partnerships or mergers, 
geographical location and economic trend have an impact on failure probability. Regressions II, III 
and IV include the interaction terms described in footnote 8. Interaction terms are not significant 
and do not change the results of regression I. Regression V includes the maximum number of 
accounts registered (accounts), available for only 153 SNSs. The hazard ratio is close to one and 
not significant. 
Figures 1 and 2 show the log-log plots regarding the specialized and target variables. In fact, the 
Cox regression model assumes that the hazard ratio is proportional over time. The proportional-
hazards assumption has not been violated, since the plotted lines are reasonably parallel. In 
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addition, a Schoenfeld test shows that there is no evidence that the proportional hazards 
assumption is globally violated.  
Figure 1. Log-log functions: specialized versus general SNSs 
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Figure 2. Log-log functions: independent versus target SNSs 
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
It is quite common to find advice and suggestions regarding the successful features of an SNS or 
the creation of a social network that makes money. Typically, such ideas draw upon exemplary 
stories, familiar to the public because they regard a handful of successful virtual communities. 
These “stories” lay on the fact that technical and financial barriers to enter the SNS industry are 
rather low (Beuscart and Mellett, 2008). However, the network effects mean that few competitors 
emerge: the information on the winners abound, while the losers leave vanishing digital traces. 
Unfortunately, knowing a lot about the leaders does not necessarily facilitate the entry of 
successful followers in the new media environment. From the perspective of empirical analysis 
and industry studies, the digitization of activities and the lack of a “register” of social media 
experiments make the data collection problematic.  
This paper had two main objectives. First, to build a database of the social networking sites that 
have appeared from 1995 onwards. To do so, the name of the social network had to be associated 
with the basic service characteristics, the methods of financing and the relationships with external 
companies. The construction of the database is not an easy task, because the data sources are 
heterogeneous and the very same definition of social networking sites raises several issues. 
Secondly, the aim of the paper was to ascertain which characteristics of SNSs are associated with 
the probability of survival in the “industry”. The empirical analysis shows that SNSs devoted to a 
particular audience and that remain independent have a higher probability of continuing their 
operations. In addition, older SNSs face a higher risk of shutting down, all else equal.  
Of course, it would be ambitious to consider these results as general and conclusive. The sample 
includes only the SNSs which, for various reasons, are “popular”, because only popularity enables 
an SNS and its characteristics to be identified. Therefore, the sample is unavoidably biased and 
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much caution is needed in interpreting the empirical results. In addition, the sample includes 
relatively few companies11.  
Future research will thus regard the enhancement of data collection, the certification of basic 
information and an increase in the SNSs under review. In addition, this paper assumes that some 
variables are one-dimensional, although SNSs adopt similar but not identical strategies to increase 
registered users and advertising revenues. For example, the advertising model of Twitter is 
different from the models of online advertising implemented by other SNSs, because goods and 
services are promoted through publicity, which means moving information in order to increase the 
awareness of products (Cha, 2013). Likewise, “user monetization” can be direct (e-commerce or 
paid subscriptions) or indirect (generating revenues from users with byproducts created by the 
SNS users themselves). In particular, many SNSs use syndications with advertising to generate 
revenues. For example, the public status of Facebook users may be linked to their other search 
results12. Of course, the definition of SNS strategies through many qualitative/dummy variables 
entails a tradeoff between descriptive ability and relevance of the econometric analysis. This issue 
merits attention given the small size of the data samples. 
From the antitrust perspective, direct and indirect network externalities of social networks allow 
few firms to dominate the market and favor the formation of monopolies or quasi-monopolies 
(Haucap and Heimeshoff, 2014). An excessive market concentration can harm users and 
consumers, and information markets are not an exception. In fact, although information markets 
are unquestionably different from “traditional” markets such as the auto or pharmaceutical 
industries, still they must respect competition law. The European Commission has clarified that 
                                                 
11 Of course, the lack of information on the number of attempts to launch an SNS makes the terms “few” and “many” 
rather ambiguous. 
12 According to media analysts (Clarke, 2008; Cong and Du, 2008; Hmedeh et al., 2011), syndication has great potential 
in the near future as a source of revenues. For a recent survey on social\ media business models, see Rohn (2015). 
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information markets are subject to the basic rules of articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union13 (Fietkiewicz and Lins, 2016). 
The time span during which a firm maintains its dominant position is a crucial issue to assess if the 
exercise of market power is detrimental to consumers. Users, consumers and advertisers are not 
harmed if an online social network is dominant for a short period. Rather, users can benefit from 
network effects and service complementarities that arise within social networks. This paper has 
shown that “young” SNSs have a higher probability of survival with respect to “old” and 
experienced competitors. This result resembles a Schumpeterian competition where entrant firms, 
in order to gain market share and achieve a monopolistic position, invest in innovations that 
benefit users, convincing them to bear switching costs and abandon the old network for a new one. 
In addition, the high survival rates of specialized SNSs can alleviate the pervasiveness of dominant 
and generalist platforms (e.g., Facebook) and favor market fragmentation, in view of the multi-
homing behavior of many consumers. Hence, the empirical results of this paper seem to lessen the 
antitrust concerns regarding the SNS industry, at least with regard to abuses of dominant position 
(Messina, 2006).  
However, Schumpeter himself (1994 [1954]: 897 f.) warned that “there are means available to the 
successful entrepreneur - patents, 'strategy', and so on-for prolonging the life of his monopolistic 
or quasi-monopolistic position and for rendering it more difficult for competitors to close up on 
him…”. Mergers and acquisitions certainly belong to the “strategies” adopted by some companies 
to maintain their dominance in the SNS industry. The sample of this paper includes acquisitions 
operated by Google, Amazon, Microsoft, Telefonica and Yahoo14. The majority of these giants have 
                                                 
13 A recent example is the merger of Facebook and WhatsApp, notified to the European Commission in 2014. The 
Commission did not oppose the transaction, in spite of the dominant position of each company in adjacent markets 
and some complementarities between the services provided (Fietkiewicz and Lins, 2016).  
14 Facebook completed about 60 acquisitions between 2005 and 2016. 
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attempted to launch a proprietary virtual community. Acquiring an SNS with a certain popularity is 
a quick way to get essential technology, intangible assets and consumer goodwill. An acquisition 
permits to maintain both the successful functionalities of an SNS and the mass of its 
users/subscribers. The complete and instantaneous “transfer” of clients and customers from one 
company to another is not observable in “traditional” markets, although consumer’s trust and 
loyalty can facilitate the post-merger integration process. In addition, many mergers in the SNS 
industry can be anti-competitive: in addition to horizontal acquisitions aimed at eliminating a 
competitor, some takeovers prevent that a social network fall in the hands of rivals (Waller and 
Sag, 2015). These strategies are not easy to detect, especially when the size of the target company 
is small. In fact, antitrust authorities must focus on mergers that reach a certain turnover 
threshold, because the main concern regards the structural effect of the planned mergers and the 
consequences on market power and collusive practices. However, the SNS industry is peculiar also 
in this respect. First, mergers involve a limited amount of tangible resources, whose re-
organization would increase, in traditional industries, the costs of the whole transaction. In other 
words, acquiring an SNS does not entail excessive “material” efforts for the acquirer company. 
Second, the acquirer company has direct access to a mass of users that facilitates the generation 
of direct and cross network externalities. Hence, although the impact on market structure is 
negligible, mergers can increase the future chances to conserve a dominant position. These 
circumstances, along with the high probability of closure of the target companies, induce a 
thorough analysis of the anti-competitive nature of acquisitions in the SNS industry. Such analysis 
is a crucial point of a broader debate regarding the compatibility of current competition law with 
the rapid developments of information markets.  
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